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The radical implications of Psychoanalysis 
for a Critical Social Psychology 
Tom Goodwin 
Leeds Beckett University, UK 
The truth of psychoanalysis lies in its loyalty to its most provocative hypotheses. (Marcuse, 1970, 
p.61) 
If one takes psychoanalysis ... into account, seriously, effectively, practically, this would be a nearly 
unimaginable earthquake. Indescribable. Even for psychoanalysts. (Derrida, 2004, p.179) 
 
To include psychoanalysis in a volume dedicated to critical social psychology is not without 
contention. In its myriad forms from classical Freudianism, through the developments of Melanie 
Klein, Jacques Lacan and others, to the orthodoxy of ego-psychology in the United States, 
psychoanalysis has itself been subject to pertinent radical critique for, amongst other things, its truth 
status, its normative clinical function, and its political conservativism. In recent iterations of critical 
psychology, exemplified in Fox, Prilleltensky and Austin’s (2009) collection Critical Psychology: an 
Introduction, the pervasive notion of a radical project comprises critiques of both individualising and 
exclusionary tendencies in traditional psychological practice. Here, mainstream psychology connects 
to regimes of truth in which a model of a white, bourgeois, heterosexual, non-disabled male 
epitomises normality and pursues goals of self-fulfilment that support and replicate capitalist 
economic systems. The demise of cooperation between participants and intolerance towards human 
difference within these regimes places the onus for psychological wellbeing on socially assimilated 
individuals and pushes those who can’t adapt towards the margins. The response of this strand of 
critical psychology is, laudably, to highlight the oppression of marginalized groups and effect positive 
changes in the status and lifestyle of those excluded. Liberation and community psychologies 
dominate such thinking with an agenda of emancipation and a model of psychological health and 
wellbeing that, moving beyond individual concerns, has “psychopolitical validity” (Prilleltensky et al, 
2009).  
In such a critical model, psychoanalysis is often found wanting. In Freud’s lifetime, for example, his 
work was criticised for an essential conservativism in the pages of Karl Krauss’s radical newspaper 
Die Fackel (The Torch), which levelled accusations against the “cult” of psychoanalysis whose 
practitioners place “their knowledge and skills at the disposal of the ruling classes” (Krauss in Szasz, 
1990, p.135). Krauss similarly denounces Freud’s quietism over issues such as the illegality of 
homosexuality and the compulsory treatment of the mad; questions that Freud was well placed to 
challenge. The history of psychoanalysis since Freud’s death also reveals a number of darker faces 
that question it as a radical enterprise.  The complicity of certain psychoanalysts with the military 
Junta in Argentina during the late 1970s (Levinson, 2003), the failure of the (mostly Jewish) 
psychoanalytic community to anticipate and resist the rise of Nazism in Germany and then deal 
appropriately with its legacy (Landa, 1999; Frosh, 2005) are particular low points. Whilst both these 
examples demonstrate the extremes of a politically reactionary psychoanalysis, they also highlight a 
more quotidian spirit of conservativism in the general psychoanalytic project such as the relation 
between clinical practice and normative processes, its individualized response to trans-individual 
phenomena and its often inflexible conceptual frame. 
Since its inception, however, psychoanalysis has had a major impact on critical thinking in the 
humanities and social sciences that continues today. Stephen Frosh acknowledges a “cyclical pattern 
of repudiation and resurrection that psychoanalysis seems to undergo within academic settings” 
(2013, p.5), a polarised reception which testifies to uncertainty in what it offers. What Frosh 
highlights is that neither uncritical acceptance nor outright rejection is an adequate response to 
psychoanalysis and reflects instead a fundamental tension that Freud places at the heart the human 
subject. This is a tension, furthermore, that feeds into theory, making psychoanalysis from the 
outset a necessarily restless discipline built on a foundational conflict. As a result of this, and to the 
frustration of analysts and critics alike, there is no single and unifying theory of psychoanalysis and 
the contemporary landscape reveals a programme that, despite institutional attempts to the 
contrary, is internally divided and globally dispersed. As Sergio Benvenuto (2009) interestingly notes, 
unlike other academic and clinical disciplines, psychoanalysis does not have a lingua franca and 
responds anew to each linguistic and cultural context where it embeds.  
Freud produced two substantive models of the psyche; a first topography, or dynamic model based 
primarily on his model of dreams and a second structural topography in which the psyche is divided 
into distinct agencies that interact. To suggest a simple progression between models, however, 
would be a generous reading at best. The various theoretical strands within Freud often rub against 
one another, producing confusing and often contradictory statements that cannot be ironed over. 
The post-Freudian context is in many ways defined by groups favouring either the earlier or later 
work and emphasising different aspects of these. In her examination of radical trends within 
psychoanalysis, Andrea Hurst notes how Freud’s “texts are not presented as the final ‘writing up’ of 
a theoretical foundation ... they are, rather, the provisional documentation of theoretical insights 
that remain open to modification” (2008, p.16-7). For many in the mainstream psychological 
traditions this poses a problem for coherence and respectability that cannot be ignored.  
Rather than seeing the conflicted nature of psychoanalytic discourse as reason for dismissing its 
insights, however, I will argue that this impasse reveals instead something at the heart of the 
Freudian project that opens up its radical potential.  Whilst the admirable focus on social justice, 
welfare and emancipation for all individuals is not disputed here, at the heart of any critical social 
psychology must always be the opportunity for the radical reimagining of ideas and the 
transformation of frames of understanding and the object or subject to be understood. Each 
element in the designation “critical social psychology” needs continual interrogation for it to avoid 
the claims of discursive mastery and expertise whose exercise in arbitrary power structures it so 
successfully highlights and challenges in mainstream psychology. Psychoanalysis provides impetus 
for this through Freud’s “discovery” of the unconscious, and its linking to sexuality, which places 
ineradicable conflict at the heart of the psyche and produces a decentred subject that is stripped of 
all prior philosophical assurances. This introduces fluidity into any conception of the individual that 
allows connections to be drawn between psychological, social and historical realms. Whilst 
psychoanalysis sutures together personal and social domains, Freud’s originary concepts also place 
their distinction and separation continually under question, allowing for critical reflection in both 
fields. 
Even before the specific theoretical concepts that Freud develops and the challenge that these pose 
to the scientific and philosophical ideas of his day and ours, there is a radical spirit in his 
investigations that underpin their formalization. This spirit is born of the conflict that Freud traces in 
the human subject and whose understanding he attempts to contain in language and concepts that 
are never adequate. Psychoanalysis offers critical social psychology a multi-faceted consideration of 
how the self is produced from disparate and often contradictory demands, giving rise to unstable 
subjectivity. Not only does this enable its programme of individual emancipation and social 
transformation, but there is also an additional sense of profound resistance to straightforward 
understanding and interpretation in the object of investigation which opens up any account to the 
uncertain ground of its own formulations and assertions. The psychoanalytic enterprise is continually 
undermined by its object and any related discipline that draws on or is drawn into its orbit must 
contend with this disturbance. As I will demonstrate in this chapter, this is not necessarily negative, 
although it can and has led to defensive measures against dissolution that have produced 
institutional stasis. Like the individual and social milieu it engages, cohesion and instability are in 
constant tension in theory such that the threat posed by its object is also the promise of its future 
reimagining and survival.  
The three motifs of conflict, decentring and resistance that I have identified in this introduction will 
feed through the remaining consideration of the radical implications of psychoanalysis for critical 
social psychology. I will first identify the psychoanalytic challenge to traditional psychology and its 
stubbornly held notion of centred subjectivity which Freud recognised as untenable but that seems 
inexorably wedded to western understandings of selfhood. Unusually in a volume such as this, the 
focus of critical attack will not be another type of psychology but a particular North American 
characterisation of psychoanalysis that shares much common ground with mainstream psychology. 
A critique of its own internal forms will not only have implications for any psychology predicated on 
a unified and transparent notion of selfhood, but will also demonstrate a problem inherent in 
psychoanalysis itself that I will trace back to Freud’s work. This problem is the tension between 
conservative and radical tendencies that psychoanalysis locates in the human subject and which 
feeds into its own theories and practice. For reasons that I will explore, radical insight too often gives 
way to a more tempered and culturally assimilable form of psychoanalysis that supports rather than 
challenges existing psychical and social arrangements. Psychoanalyst Jean Laplanche argues that this 
is where Freud and his legacy often “goes astray” (1999, p.82) and misrecognises the significance of 
its insights. The rebuttal of these reactionary positions is provided in the tensions that inhere in 
psychoanalytic concepts that become radical as their roots are interrogated. I will focus on what are 
for many the two exemplary and revolutionary psychoanalytic theories, those of the unconscious 
and sexuality, and demonstrate how these concepts are founded on radical principles that have 
profound ramifications for (social) psychological understanding.  
Psychoanalytic orthodoxy: the problem of/with the ego 
For many critical theorists the reactionary formulations that dominate public understandings of 
psychoanalysis are derived from its reception and development in North America (Marcuse, 1955; 
Jacoby, 1975; Frosh, 2010). The American Psychoanalytic Association (APsaA) was formed in 1911 
and, in opposition to Freud’s (1926) views on the selection of analysts, pursued between 1938 and 
1987 a training agenda that excluded non-medical practitioners. As such, the practice of 
psychoanalysis was firmly embedded in psychiatry, and the medico-scientific respectability of this 
connection was opposed to the laxness of training statutes in the psychoanalytic institutions of other 
nations such as Britain and France. This approach fed into a golden age of psychoanalytic popularity 
in the United States as the APsaA rose to dominance on the global stage and reflected an image of 
its practice out across the world. Producing “training regimes that reward conformity and militate 
against creative and critical thinking” (Frosh, 2010, p.14), however, this created an aura of stiffness 
and conservatism within the APsaA and treatment followed a similarly conformist trajectory. 
Curative ideals were founded on models of normative development that in its most influential 
iterations, posited identity formation and ego integrity as their goal.   
The central work of Erik Erikson (1950), for example, focuses on identity and posits a stage theory of 
development in which stability and unity of ego function are the ultimate achievement. Such a 
developmental aim coincides with social relationships that are ultimately adaptive, thus creating 
harmony and continuity between psychological health and appropriate social interaction and 
behaviour . In the clinic, similar ideals gave rise to ego psychology as the distinctively American face 
of psychoanalysis.  A term coined by Heinz Hartmann in 1939, ego psychology is a theory and 
therapeutic technique that focuses on the organizing functions of the ego as it develops autonomy. 
This understanding derives from Freud’s second model where the psyche is divided into distinct 
agencies, and the ego “puts itself forward as the representative of the whole person” (Laplanche and 
Pontalis, 1988, p.452). In this structure, the ego is seen as being subject to unreasonable demands 
from internal drives and the external environment and needs to protect itself.  
As the child develops, its newly formed and vulnerable ego employs defence mechanism to manage 
the various threats and tensions that assault it. As Anna Freud noted in her 1936 text The Ego and 
the Mechanisms of Defence, these are invariably maladaptive in the infant and seek to protect 
through exclusion. Conflict thus returns as if from outside in unexpected and distressing ways. 
Successful development, which provides a model for psychotherapeutic practice, coincides with 
producing more adaptive responses that deal with conflicts directly in an increasingly autonomous 
ego, enlarged through progressive internalization (i.e. representation) of instinctual and external 
forces. Mental health and psychopathology are conceived in terms of this adaptive function, with 
therapy identifying maladaptive defences that constrain the individual and building ego integrity 
more securely so that forces imposing negatively on the self can be mastered and thereby 
overcome. The ego becomes a centring structure that responds appropriately to and autonomously 
of social strictures, and tames a drive life perceived to threaten both the self and the established 
social fabric. By focussing on the ego, ego psychology was assimilable to psychiatry and enjoyed a 
close correspondence with the general psychological revolution in twentieth century America that 
made the individual its focus. 
For a critical social psychology framework there are considerable issues with this approach to 
psychoanalytic theory and technique. Writing at the high point of its popularity in the 1970s, Russell 
Jacoby rejects ego psychology as inherently reactionary because it ignores the impact of social forces 
in the constitution and positioning of the individual subject. This “social amnesia” in its theory 
produces a defensive individualism that repeats and feeds into the capitalist structure of North 
American society. In treatment, the innovation and critical reflexivity required for radical change 
(initially in, although not restricted to, the individual patient) is eschewed in favour of a clinical 
practice that measures cure in terms of how successfully the analysand indentifies her ego with that 
of the analyst. The impact of social forces on the individual, particularly as these generate the 
oppressive conditions that frame the personal repressions and conflict so central to Freudian theory, 
is largely ignored. Influenced by Freud’s later works on civilisation and the mutual impact of social 
and psychical structures, the Frankfurt  School  theorist Herbert Marcuse (1961) acknowledges how 
every internal barrier that generates repression was first an external obstacle knitted into the fabric 
of the historical process that constitutes a society. Before the individual can self-determine, they are 
determined by a network of historical and social relations that are then distilled in the psyche. Social 
oppression and psychical repression are intimately related in ways that eschew the simple 
formulations that a discrete and autonomous individual must accept the laws of social living, despite 
conflict with its instinctual demands. Instead, social and historical processes are traced into the heart 
of subjectivity to the extent that even the concept of the individual is constructed through specific 
ideologies. The autonomous self so celebrated in late capitalist ideology is one such distillation of 
the historical process at the level of the individual. 
Jacoby sees how “ego psychology grinds down the cutting edge of psychoanalysis” (1975, p.41), 
separating the psyche from its relational and contextual milieu in a way that is more palatable for 
the individualist market place in North America.  This criticism against US psychoanalytic orthodoxy 
is echoed by a number of psychoanalytic schools in mostly European and South American contexts. It 
is the force of this response which reminds us of the critical edge that psychoanalysis still fosters in 
its classical Freudian guise and its key reimagining in the works of Melanie Klein and the object 
relations theorists in Britain, the work of Jacques Lacan and the innovative post-Lacanian generation 
in France, and the varied developments and combinations of these approaches in the rest of the 
world. There is a sense in these related positions that ego psychology is somehow a misreading of 
Freud that sanitises his key insights and seeks to resolve an irresolvable foundational conflict with 
notions of selfhood that return to a unified subjectivity he had already undermined. Whilst ego 
psychology is a limited reading of psychoanalysis that removes its potentially radical spirit, it does, 
however, represent a very distinct trend within Freud’s corpus that cannot be ignored and opens up 
profound questions for the possibility of conceptualising that which fundamentally resists 
comprehension; these questions will be explored in due course. 
Ego psychology derives from Freud’s mature reflections following his text The Ego and the Id (1923) 
and the construction of his second topography. Here, the first topography which opposes the 
unconscious to the preconscious-conscious as different levels of representation in a dynamic system, 
is supplanted by distinct and localizable psychical agencies. In the first topography, Freud 
understands the psyche as a closed system around which drive energy flows and that functions 
according to the primary process (or pleasure principle). The uninterrupted flow of a manageable 
quantity of energy maintains homeostasis which can be interrupted when pressure is allowed to 
build up at various points. Pressure generates discomfort which is inherently pleasurable when 
released. In his 1915 texts Repression and The Unconscious, Freud clarifies the relationship between 
the body (soma) and the psyche as that of the iInstincts and their representatives. The instincts are 
not a direct component of the psyche, and are in themselves unknowable, but their force is 
imprinted on the psyche through the ideas they attach to in the course of an individual’s 
development. Freud speaks of Vorstellungsrepräsentanz (the ideational representatives) to denote 
this transfer from the functioning of the body to that of the psyche. Different levels of consciousness 
are determined by the quality of representation and how these allow drive energy attached to be 
expressed and hence discharged. As the expressions of instincts that are unbounded by moral 
pressures, the ideational representatives are subject to censorship as the developing self undergoes 
necessary reality testing. This process removes the possibility of conscious articulation from certain 
representatives as these are deemed personally or socially transgressive. This censorship of 
psychical material and its crystallization into various unspeakable complexes is what Freud describes 
as repression, and in his first topography denotes the formation and contents of the unconscious. 
Pressure from the unconscious persists unabated and its satisfaction must be sought through partial 
means in the form of compromises. Modelled on his theory of dreams, the transfer from repressed 
content to its disguised expression accounts for a whole range of largely disruptive psychical 
phenomena including, most significantly, the symptoms manifest in neurotics. 
The inadequacies of this model were revealed in the clinic as Freud encountered cases that did not 
neatly fit his understanding of neurosis. These non-neurotic cases, as André Green describes them, 
(2005) included disorders of the personality (e.g. nNarcissism), self-distortions (e.g. melancholia) and 
numerous borderline phenomena (straddling both neurotic and psychotic experiences) which all 
somehow implicated the development and operation of the ego.  This required a new understanding 
of the psyche with a focus on the ego as a centring structure of the self and the way this is 
constructed in relation to processes of investment (love) and identification with significant others. 
The ego mediates between instinctual demands, the demands of reality and a further demand from 
the parental and social expectations that we internalise as we enter civilised community. Instincts, 
along with repressed material, are now placed in a new conceptual agency termed the id (das es), 
whilst the agency that judges and criticises the self according to the standards of the internalised 
parents is denoted the superego. The ego develops out of the id as a surface “which has been 
modified by the direct influence of the external world” (Freud, 1923, p.25). Constituted as the 
perception system represents and affords a basic reflection upon pleasure seeking activities, it is 
formed of various precipitates as it mediates and represents its relationships with significant objects 
in the world “transforming the id’s will into action as if it were its own” (ibid. p.25) and directing 
instincts to more acceptable ends. Development of the ego as a discrete psychical entity requires it 
to be loved and invested by the id as though it were an object, which leads Freud to postulate his 
key concept of narcissism in a text of the same name from 1914. Not simply the vanity and self-
obsession of certain adult pathologies, narcissism becomes a necessary stage in psychical 
development that allows the tenuous self-boundaries of the infant to be shored up before opening 
out onto object love.  
Freud’s focus on the ego and the narcissism necessary for its construction is a defining aspect of the 
transition from first to second topographies and shifts the theoretical emphasis from conflict to 
defence. The ego psychologists exploit Freud’s description of ego formation and transform it into a 
prescription for ideal therapeutic outcome and an imperative for late-capitalist living. In its 
theorisation of narcissism as a fundamental stage in psychical development, psychoanalysis 
“indirectly favoured narcissism’s cultural primacy”, giving way to a “troubling cult of one’s own 
psyche” (Benvenuto, 2009, p.18) where the pains and frustrations of conflict are no longer engaged 
with as a fundamental instability in the subject but are defended against with the ultimate goal of 
their resolution and removal.  
This ego-centring and its celebration of narcissistic individualism is clearly at odds with critical social 
psychology. For many psychoanalysts it is also a tempering of Freud’s revolutionary insight that, as 
Green (2005) argues, is a feature of his second topography in particular. The centring on the ego 
already noted is pre-empted by a corollary centring of the psyche on the id in which the unconscious 
is often reduced to instinctual processes explicable in a biological register. As Jaboby (1975) notes, 
the Freud of the later period seems caught between a psychology of the ego that is in danger of 
reverting to pre-Freudian notions of the humanist self and an id psychology that is strays closely to 
biological essentialism. An original decentring of human subjectivity often succumbs to a counter-
tendency that re-centres the individual according to new psychical agencies. This creates a 
psychoanalytic project that fits more readily into an institutional mould, but is also its greatest 
betrayal. The ego and id psychologies that Freud vacillates between are two sides of an inward turn 
that tempers the radical edge of the psychoanalytic revolution by ignoring the social, relational and 
contextual factors that produce and yet put in question the sanctity of the individual. Laplanche sees 
this reactionary centring action as almost inevitable, as ego integrity and its corollary notion of 
biological instinct covers over harsh realities of psychological fragmentation to justify unquestioned 
appeals to greater social and psychological cohesion. With such politically problematic and 
fundamentally deceptive tendencies, he highlights the necessity of returning to what is most radical 
in Freud’s work, especially the notion of unconscious and its intimate links with sexuality, to present 
a counter-trend to these common-sense formulations. He notes a “domestication of the 
unconscious” (1999, p.67) that is effective both at the level of the developing individual and, through 
what he terms theoreticogenesis, at the level of the theory that describes this. Freud’s work falls 
into this pattern almost from the outset as he attempts to systematise the unconscious and establish 
its economic principles. His first model of repression, for example, postulates the existence of 
unknown content in the structure of the self, but for the most part (until he considers the thesis of 
primal repression) these contents were once experiential traces whose ability to be expressed has 
simply been removed by censorship. Locked away in the depths of the psyche they are still tangible 
and can make logical (hence economic) connections to restore them to comprehension. Like Freud’s 
recourse to biological instincts, the centring on ego structures is simply replaced by a centre that is 
hidden from view in the unconscious. Laplanche uncovers this fundamental “going astray” 
(fourvoiement) in all the major post-Freudian schools, even, those that demonstrate radical 
openings such as the Kleinians and Lacanians. 
 
The radical implications of unconscious alterity and its roots in the sexual 
Laplanche returns to the meaning of Freud’s self-proclaimed Copernican revolution and its 
foundational gesture of decentring. He examines Copernicus’s radical displacement of the earth (and 
hence Man) from the centre of the universe as an unfinished revolution in which heliocentrism (that 
the earth spins around the sun) is one step in a repeated movement of eccentricity (i.e. does the sun 
itself spin around a centre which in turn spins around a centre and so on). What Laplanche clarifies is 
that the Copernican revolution is the continual refusal of any centring action (at least as a 
permanent fixture). Here, the construction of systematic description is both essential to avoid the 
chaos of incomprehension, but also necessarily incomplete. This point echoes Hurst’s argument as 
she considers deconstructionist responses to psychoanalysis. She highlights an irresolvable tension 
in the conceptual apparatus of Freud that vacillates between sense, in which a coherent economic 
system can be formulated, and something that points beyond and rubs against this. This latter 
realm, which Hurst refers to as the aneconomic, is the condition of “unpredictability, chance, 
anomaly, irreconcilabilty, and conflict” (2008, p.42) that generates and opposes the economic.  
Drawing on Jacques Derrida’s use of the Greek term aporia to denote an intractable logical 
contradiction, she determines Freudian concepts as poised between economic explanation and 
aneconomic conditions that must be continually and yet impossibly assimilated. With only partial 
success possible, psychoanalytic understanding produces a remainder that is both a persistent threat 
and the promise of its (continual) future elaboration. Hurst explains here the necessity of 
restlessness in Freudian theory and the fraught legacy it creates. 
There is no greater example of the tension between economic and aneconomic moments in Freud’s 
work than in his introduction and continual reformulations of the concept of the unconscious. The 
idea, as Freud acknowledges, is not his own, but has a long history in figures such as Plato, Goethe 
and Schopenhauer recognizing that humans are fundamentally self-deceptive and cover over 
troubling aspects of existence such as lust and aggression. In Freud’s early clinical work, he had 
direct experience of this resistance to knowing in hysterical patients. His famous formulation that 
“hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences” (Breuer & Freud, 1897, p.7) recognizes how an aspect 
of experience can be refused conscious articulation because it is traumatic and yet is still retained in 
the psyche. In its non-acknowledgement it continues to act on conscious life in the form of 
disruptive and symptomatic behaviour. Freud sought to systemtize this basic description of the 
unconscious to remove its spiritual and metaphysical roots and use it to understand a number of 
disparate and inexplicable clinical phenomena. It is this systemitization of the unconscious that is 
Freud’s greatest contribution to the history of ideas as he sought ever more effective economic 
explanations. The danger of such a move, however, is that “the economic constitution of any closed 
or regulated system, in any domain, necessarily goes hand in hand with the suppression of the 
anecomonic or that which in relation to a system remains errant, disordered, resistant, aleatory, 
unexpected or nonsensical.” (Hurst, 2008, p.98). To order the unconscious in a closed economy 
presumes a centre which, by not considering the system as necessarily incomplete and open to 
reimaginings, potentially loses sight of what in it remains radical. Freud’s theory of the unconscious 
is at its most innovative and revolutionary where it reveals the “aporetic logic that makes it 
necessary to avoid a choice between economic and aneconomic.” (ibid. p.101). Characterizing the 
unconscious in terms of “exemption from mutual contradiction, primary process (mobility of 
cathexes), timelessness and replacement of external by psychical reality” (1915b, p.187), Freud 
highlights the challenge of the unconscious to structures of proper and good sense. Laplanche 
extends this element of the illogical and draws on the notion of otherness inherent in the concept. 
This is an idea of the other that bears little resemblance to a second consciousness in a coherent 
dialogue, but is instead a radical alterity that cannot be found, systematized or successfully 
accommodated in the contours of the self and that continually disturbs its presumed integrity.  
It is against this radical otherness that the self is constructed and must be maintained. The 
unconscious is foremost a foreign body that opens onto non-self structures and yet, whose alien-
ness suffers continual domestication. Just as the ego’s defensive functions seek to quell its disruptive 
action, theoretical efforts similarly attempt to contain its elusive action in forms that render it once 
and for all. Freud’s notion of the id in his second topography, for example, is borrowed from his 
contemporary Georg Groddeck, but stripped of its intended sense to denote how we are “’lived’ by 
unknown and uncontrollable forces” (Freud, 1923, p.23). This sense of “it” (the more direct 
translation of das es) as an alien structure of demands to which the self must respond is lost, as 
Freud’s complex understanding of sexual life is forgotten in favour of a biological instinct that is 
included in the economy of the psyche. As Hurst recognizes, Freud seems caught in a “residual 
metaphysical commitment” (2008, p.134) that often prevents him from pushing the radical 
implications of his ideas or sees him return to ideas he had already overturned. It is the potential of 
his ideas on sexuality and how they underpin his original conception of the unconscious that is 
arguably where Freud is at his most radical and demonstrates the value of his insight for critical 
social psychology. Challenging instinctual models that fix the sexual aim in the reproduction of the 
species, Freud’s sexual theories resist the closing-in of the human being and remind us of our 
eroticised connection to other people as this generates subjectivity yet also, as Adam Phillips notes 
“makes us feel at odds with ourselves.” (1995, p.91).  The security of social and psychological 
identity is always predicated on a renunciation of sexuality as a fluid and connective process, thus 
opposing self-knowledge to sexual pleasure and affection. 
The radical nature of sexuality, which also removes it from a simple instinctual register, lies in the 
prematurity of human birth which places the helpless infant in a relation of absolute dependence on 
another person. Freud ascribes the primary care role to the mother who not only meets the child’s 
needs but also elicits pleasure and affords satisfaction. For Freud, the first relation is erotic through 
and through as the mother “not only nourishes [the child] but also looks after it and thus arouses in 
it a number of other physical sensations, pleasurable and unpleasurable” (Freud, 1940, p.188). 
Theorising a dynamic of physical and sensate relations between child and mother, Freud 
controversially introduces a theory of infantile sexuality which implicates another person in the 
eroticisation of the child’s body. Caught in this relational dynamic, human sexuality is no longer 
understood as a pre-programmed biological function, but instead characterised as “a whole range of 
excitations and activities ... which procure a pleasure that cannot be adequately explained in terms 
of the satisfaction of a basic physiological need.” (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988, p.418).  
Freud uses the German word Trieb to distinguish the human sexual impulse from Instinkt , the 
hereditary characteristics of a species (this distinction is not clearly and consistently translated into 
English). Trieb (best rendered as “drive”) is the demand of the child’s body, firstly on maternal care 
and, through the progressive internalisation of this relation as the self forms, on the psyche. A 
concept at the limit of the psyche and soma, Trieb attaches to psychical representatives providing a 
motive for human life, but is in itself unknowable. Irreducible to the body, it is first experienced by 
the infant as unfocussed and non-specific pressures demanding satisfaction. Freud theorises the 
fragmented quality of drives at this early infantile stage and designates these as “polymorphously 
perverse” (1905, p.191) because their function resembles those of the perversions in later adult life. 
As maternal care focuses the child’s attention on different physiological and social processes such as 
feeding, potty training and the separation from dependency, ”his care affords him an unending 
source of sexual excitation and satisfaction from his erogenous zones” (Ibid. p.223), meaning that 
different aspects of the child’s body become eroticised, creating associated component instincts. All 
the developmental milestones that produce the sexual and socialised adult enter an economy of 
pleasure and unpleasure which is modelled on sensual sucking at the breast. 
Intimately tied to the possibility of human subjectivity and active at all points as its motivation, 
sexuality also introduces alterity by placing the relation with another person at the core of being. 
Laplanche identifies two key aspects to this notion of otherness that offer radical possibilities for 
rethinking notions of the psychological and the social. The first of these is a notion of asymmetry; 
that the other precedes who we are, and despite the best efforts at ego integrity, it imposes its 
might and threat unabated. This intrusion of the other into the structures of the self is troubling and 
frequently evoked with the language of trauma as its necessary but unwanted demand shakes us to 
the foundations. The second aspect is its enigma, its fundamental unknowability that cannot be 
comfortably brought within the comprehension of an assimilating ego. This is alterity without form; 
the pre-linguistic sexuality that characterizes early relationships and which, through our latter 
repressions constitutes the economy of the unconscious and its aneconomic foundation. As 
Laplanche states, Freud accorded primacy to sexuality because it “opens directly onto the question 
of the other, and in the case of the child, onto the adult other in his or her alien-ness” (1999, p.64). 
As the prototype for the encounter with asymmetry and enigma, the eroticised first relation is 
traced as inassimilable infantile experience, defining the unconscious in its radical alterity.  
Freud’s notion of the sexual eroticises the individual from the outset and compromises the concept 
of stable identity that underpins liberal humanist ideology and mainstream social psychological 
theories of self and identity. Sexuality is dangerous and a challenge to reactionary social structures 
and the psychological stability this underpins. Civilization requires not only the control of sexual 
forces, but also the occultation of erotic life in the process of repression.   The tenuous and 
permeable boundaries of early infant experience are covered over and divested of their enigmatic 
sexual content as the ego increasingly steps out as autonomous subject. As a consequence of the 
civilising demand, psychoanalysis has also effected a “progressive shrinking of the field of sexuality” 
(Green ,2005, p.82) in its own theorising. The constraints on sexuality in the direction of civilized 
living are echoed in clinical and developmental theories, such as those of Erikson and Hartmann, that 
advocate the same or simply divest it of its alterity, just as Freud did in his return to the biological 
instinct. What is lost most fundamentally in this neglect of the sexual is a connection to the other 
that is more foundational than the self. The subject faces alterity from the outset of existence and 
must somehow construct itself against and in spite of this. Of course, what was once other can be 
accommodated within the structures of the developing ego, but this is never once and for all, as 
Freud’s radical notion of the unconscious attests. Conceptions of otherness in psychoanalysis are 
various as theorists have wrestled differently with the implications of a self constructed in the 
intermediary space between the instinctual body, intimate relationships, and the socio-symbolic 
structures that frame these. Each of these aspects has been the focus of different psychoanalytic 
approaches for theorising the alterity at the heart of subjectivity.  
The unconscious other, for example, can be inscribed in the drive as Freud increasingly contended, 
when pressure from the body erupts into consciousness as uncontained anxiety, or when mediated 
as a symptom or a dream, combines reassuring repetitions of behaviour with a disturbing 
unfamiliarity. For the object-relations theorists, in contrast, alterity is traced in the relation to the 
object and not to the id. The alterity of the external object is precipitated in the psyche through a 
representational process to become the inner world. Here, as Green elaborates, the object is a 
“property of the ego ... to ward of the strangeness of the object” but at the same time has a “part 
that is irreducible to any form of appropriation by the ego which calls for the recognition of 
difference and alterity.” (p.117). Linguistic theories of psychoanalysis such as Lacan’s add to the 
theory of the object by extending the notion of individual representation from the realm of the 
image and the personal relation to a consideration of what Green refers to as “the cultural tradition 
and its productions laid down as a ‘treasure of the signifier’” (2005, p.105). The alterity of the object 
and the drives it arouses as if from another place are mediated by a structure of representation 
which is also not our own. We encounter language as an external force, the alterity of our social 
world, whose insistence that we engage in its community constructs our symbolic existence, but 
always as inadequate. The alterity of language carves out the unconscious as it constructs the 
unspoken (Lacan designates this the real which also describes the preverbal drives) and the 
unspeakable (the prohibited connection to and desired satisfaction of those drives as prescribed by 
socio-symbolic existence) aspects of subjectivity as an internal other; an alterity even more radical 
because it also compromises the inner-outer boundaries. Wherever the alterity inscribed in the 
subject is located by successive psychoanalytic theories, attempts to render the form and operation 
of the unconscious always prove inadequate. Theory here reflects the individual faced with a 
message or demand from the other which, in its asymmetry and enigma, calls for codes and 
deciphering that are never sufficient, leaving something out “something untranslatable which 
becomes the unconscious, the internal other.” (Laplanche, 1999, p.101).  
Despite the persistent attempts to sanitise psychoanalytic insight of its most radical aspects in the 
pursuit of institutional stability and respectability, Freud’s original discovery of the unconscious and 
its foundations in sexual life provides a continually renewed opening towards alterity. This radical 
awareness of the causal nature of otherness in both personal and social life challenges typical 
accusations that psychoanalysis neglects the impact on the subject of social and historical forces. 
Psychoanalysis provides a structure for explaining ego development and its necessary role in 
assuring a sense of personal and social stability. For Freud, however, it is conflict that characterises 
the human being and this is largely generated as the civilising environment demands some 
renunciation of the instinctual body. Theoretical attempts which ignore this  invariably repress the 
most radical psychoanalytic insights and produce reactionary accounts of subjectivity and 
instrumental therapeutic efforts that leave the sense of a critical project far behind. We only have to 
look at the social identity theories of Henri Tajfel and the social learning theory of Albert Bandura to 
see how mainstream social psychology ignores this psychoanalytic imperative. Reducing social 
behaviour and self-concept to the cognitive processes involved in group membership (Tajfel, 1974) 
or the identification with role models (Bandura, 1977), there is no substantive concept of the social 
beyond small group interactions,that would allow us to recognise its fundamental instability and 
alterity. Any understanding of the psychical mechanisms that enable us to inhabit these identity 
positions are similarly lacking, as consideration of the ambivalence that characterises the motivating 
drives and their connection to the self and other people is replaced by empirical description and 
attempts at universal cognitive description.  
As Benvenuto acknowledges, however, psychoanalysis provides a “revolutionary paradigm of a new 
type of knowledge and practice” (2009, p.20), at the heart of which a radical notion of the 
unconscious connects to social critique. As something alien at our core, the unconscious constitutes 
the psyche as a hybrid space in which the separation of inner and outer realms is never complete 
and notions of ego-mastery are continually undermined. Selfhood is constructed between often 
incommensurable social and personal realms and as such has a provisional character that also opens 
it up to potential transformation. Psychoanalysis can and must theorise this just as it posits various 
reasons why it too often does not happen.        
Psychoanalytic theory is poised over a fundamental non-knowledge in its object, the unconscious. 
The provocative and unique theses that psychoanalysis offers for the range of human experiences 
and behaviours always rub against a primary uncertainty. Whilst its conceptual tools revolutionised 
the understanding psychopathology, psychotherapy, selfhood and social processes, perhaps the 
most valuable contribution of psychoanalysis is its legacy of equivocal formulation that produces “a 
way of describing both the limits of what we can know and the areas of our lives in which knowing, 
and the idea of expertise, may be inappropriate.” (Phillips, 1995, p.17). Whilst psychoanalysis 
enables us to theorise subjectivity in terms of the intersection of bodily drives, social demands, 
object representations and the symbolic systems that organise them, the concept of the 
unconscious does not afford us any certainty in locating its parameters or a stable point of inquiry. 
Analysing how specific forces acting in and on the subject can be brought into contact with each 
other ties psychoanalysis to critical traditions within social and psychological theory as “the criss-
crossing of bodily and symbolic networks ... create points of coherence that fade away and re-form.” 
(Frosh, p.120). The intersectionality of various human realms in the production and understanding of 
the human being necessitates a conceptual frame that is itself dynamic and critical of its own ability 
to centre authoritative commentary. 
This critical tension that psychoanalysis introduces into human inquiry can also be demonstrated in 
the research environment. Using psychoanalytic ideas to study young masculine identities, Frosh, 
Phoenix and Pattman (2003) reflect on the status of their theoretical frame with reference to the 
object under investigation and how this informs the understanding of male identity as ambiguous; 
an underpinning that problematizes any research findings. Psychoanalytic concepts are introduced 
alongside discourse analysis to describe not only how identity positions are inscribed within a socio-
cultural domain, but also what motivates the inhabiting of identities in particular individuals. Whilst 
the authors recognize the importance of culture in structuring gender positions, their greater insight 
is in what they describe as the “ambiguity of the social” (2003, p.40) which makes any identity 
position (here masculinity) inconsistent and marked by contradiction. This ambiguity inherent in the 
discursive construction of gender positions is also matched by the ambivalence of attachment to 
these identities, which the authors describe in psychoanalytic terms. Each of the three research 
participants given as examples, demonstrate a number of conflicts in the masculine identities that 
they assume, highlighting the necessity and limitations of considering identity in terms of both social 
positioning and agency. Psychoanalytic concepts are not simply applied to cases to redress the 
inadequacies of discursive methods but are themselves interrogated and critiqued in the process, 
with neither social nor psychological dimensions afforded explanatory dominance over the other. As 
the constitution of subjectivity is understood in the tension between social coercion and the various 
resistances this engenders, a critical model begins to emerge that aligns with the direction of my 
argument. In the one case where the research participant has assumed a seemingly unproblematic 
hegemonic masculine position, the authors conclude that this is predicated on the “occlusion of 
alternate possibilities” and is furthermore “a psychic structure always in danger of collapsing” (2003, 
p.51). Citing Judith Butler’s assertion that “crafting a sexual position … always involves being 
haunted by what is excluded” (1997, quoted in 2003, p.51), the authors note how this also describes 
the structures of masculine (and other) identity in general. More than this, however, Butler’s notion 
of haunting denotes the research process undertaken and the conceptual apparatus that frames 
this, as it contends critically with the multiplicity of possible understandings. The introduction of 
psychoanalysis to a model of discursive positioning is not simply to redefine the truth of masculine 
subjectivity, but also to create a critical tension where complexity reveals “no certainty of 
interpretation” (2003, p.52). The research, therefore, has a partial form which maps a significant 
aspect of what is being investigated (whilst furthermore providing an allegory of masculine identity), 
but a remainder – the “unsaid” as the authors describe – continues to disrupt coherence and make 
appeal to a future of possible reimagining. 
With the notion of the unconscious signalling a formative alterity and insufficiency at the heart of 
subjectivity, the idea of human completeness that is available to absolute description disappears. As 
a clinical practice, the imperative to integrate ego functions or adapt these to prevailing social 
structures is increasingly inadequate as a developmental aim or curative ideal. The stable and 
adaptable structures that ego psychologists make the pinnacle of successful individuation are 
unrealistic and maintained only within a reactionary social environment where self-knowledge is 
also a mechanism of forgetting. A radical psychoanalytic practice would eschew such ethically 
contentious premises and re-establish conflict and alterity as the basis of selfhood. As Phillips 
contends, the aim of psychoanalysis is less to make people intelligible to themselves than “to 
tolerate and enjoy the impossibility of such knowing” (p.101). Psychoanalysis is a way of making 
strange our taken-for-granted assumptions and the patterns of reaction, interaction and behaviour 
that repeat themselves as seemingly fixed characteristics. Unpicking and unsettling these ego-
formations confronts the individual with the limitations of identity and the restrictions it places on 
freedom. Psychoanalysis returns the subject in therapy to the unstable grounds of subjectivity 
where, far from fostering the collapse of selfhood, the tension between ego integrity and 
unconscious other should be persistently exposed to entice curiosity and experimentation with a 
more fluid (although certainly not unrestricted) appreciation of human existence. As Freud 
recognised from the outset, the aim of psychoanalysis is not to remove conflict but allow us to live it 
more keenly, recognising it as a motor-force of existence and its transformation, as much as a cause 
of unhappiness. 
Although its institutions are often criticised for excessive dogma in clinical technique, Freud always 
held that psychoanalytic theory should be ready to adapt to what it encounters in therapy. This 
imperative to imagine, challenge and rethink, however, is not so easily translated into other domains 
of inquiry. The attempt of psychoanalysts across the twentieth century to impose an interpretative 
frame on related disciplines is one that is beset with problems, as Shoshana Felman (1982) famously 
notes in relation to literary interpretation. Psychoanalysis persistently fails to appreciate the 
specificity of new objects of research from diverse fields and simply imposes its schemas on what it 
analyses to finds  its own truths. Processes within the object of interpretation that are intrinsic to its 
function and which exceed the psychoanalytic frame are reduced to its concepts. Frosh (2010) 
reiterates this point with regards to the psychoanalytic examination of social processes that could 
provide the basis for critical social psychology. He discusses the problems of psychoanalysis 
functioning as a colonising discourse that exerts mastery over related disciplines through the 
extension of unmodified concepts. Drawing on Felman’s notion of implication (which opposes blank 
application), to which the title of this chapter alludes, Frosh reiterates Freud’s insight, that 
psychoanalysis must itself be transformed as it enters into new domains and less familiar 
encounters.  
The unconscious already implicates social and relational processes in the self that resist the 
appropriations of consciousness and of theory. The exploration of these must be at the heart of a 
critical social psychology, and for this, psychoanalysis provides a theoretical vocabulary and a set of 
tools . As  a theory of subjectivity it also places the individual back in a perpetual dynamic with social 
forces that extend to intimate relations, the historical and ideological contexts that frame these and 
the symbolic systems that provide mediation. Each of these aspects is played out in the individual 
and different critical psychologies explore the various intersecting levels that impact on and 
constitute the human subject. From radical family therapies, to Marxist and discursive analyses of 
subjectivity, each facet has its critical representative. Unearthing the bio-socio-sexual substratum of 
the individual, the critical investigator is faced with the destabilised knowledge of the unconscious 
that underpins the necessarily protean concepts of psychoanalysis. The alterity inscribed in this 
exemplary psychoanalytic object is transformed as it crosses disciplinary boundaries, leaving the 
problematisation of these in its wake. No longer the expert discourse that its institutional forms 
mistakenly believe, the most radical aspects of psychoanalysis shake the very grounds on which 
related discourses stand providing critical social psychology with the spirit of Freudian subversion 
that provokes breaks in common sense and notions of authoritative truth. Extending this radical 
function into critical social psychology, psychoanalysis is itself changed in the interaction as it 
reminded of and forced to engage once more what Jacques Derrida describes as “the idea of a 
“subject” installing, progressively, laboriously, always imperfectly, the stabilized – that is, 
nonnatural, essentially and always unstable – condition of his or her autonomy: against the 
inexhaustible and invincible background of a heteronomy” (2004, p.176). Its challenge, if it is to 
remain radical and relevant is to map this strange and shifting “subject” in a discourse that 
recognizes its own destabilised foundations and yet provides hope of revolution that, like its 
Copernican prototype, opens questions and a process that cannot rest and whose interminable 
promise of transformation (psychological, social, theoretical) is still to be felt  . 
In summary, this text has examined the relation of psychoanalysis to critical social psychology as one 
beset by tension. Psychoanalysis has been rightly criticized, especially as ego psychology, for its 
inward turn and re-centering of subjectivity that forecloses critical social engagement. Building on 
radical psychoanalytic and social psychological trends, in the work of Laplanche, Green, Frosh and 
others, attempts to centre psychoanalytic discourse and its vision of the subject through recourse to 
instincts, ego building and so on, have been counterpoised to a more revolutionary conception of 
the human psyche that psychoanalysis also introduces. Explored here through the key notion of the 
unconscious and its continual displacement of subjectivity through Freud’s revised notion of 
sexuality, the constitution of selfhood, takes on a very different form from traditional humanist and 
psychological descriptions, emphasizing instead the instability at the heart of human existence. 
Placing subjectivity in a network of biological, familial and social forces, none of which can dominate 
in the formation and explanation of self, this radical psychoanalytic insight can offer critical social 
psychology a conceptual apparatus that pushes psychological understanding beyond the narrow 
parameters of ego to examine the alterity it is built against and that continually threatens to 
undermine it. This disciplinary encounter, however is not one of assimilation or colonization. In the 
crossover of conceptual frames, what resists the appropriation of the other discipline creates 
tension and produces space for critical reflection in both fields. It is therefore as much the 
restlessness of psychoanalytic discourse as its concepts that offer radical potential to critical social 
psychology. Disturbing a stable theoretical platform and introducing uncertainty and temporality 
into social psychological enquiry is a threat of course, but one that also offers the possibility of its 
future renewal and relevance. 
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